Abstract Ogawa et al. (J. Urban Econ. 60:350, 2006) analyze capital tax competition in a fixed-wage approach and show that the original results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (J. Urban Econ. 19:356, 1986) are not preserved in the presence of unemployment. In the present paper, we challenge this view and investigate capital tax competition for some arbitrary institutional setting of the labor market. We find that if the labor market is characterized by some efficient bargaining solution, the results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (J. Urban Econ. 19:356, 1986) are preserved.
Introduction
In their seminal paper, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) , hereafter ZM, explore the consequences of capital tax competition when regions are small and one factor of production, interpreted as land, is fixed. They find that (i) the optimal capital tax rate is zero when head taxes are available, and that (ii) tax competition results in underprovision of public goods (along with positive capital tax rates) when governments are restricted from using head taxes. Recently, Ogawa et al. (2006) , hereafter OST, introduce labor as a second variable factor of production in the model of ZM and analyze capital tax competition in the presence of unemployment. Using a fixed-wage approach, OST derive the following results: (i) when head taxes on immobile residents are available, the optimal capital tax rate is generically not zero, and (ii) when restrictions are imposed on head taxes, capital tax competition may result in overprovision of public goods. In addition, OST point out that increases in the capital tax rate affect employment, which is the driving force for the above mentioned results. Clearly, employment effects are absent in ZM, even if we are willing to interpret the fixed factor as labor (instead of as land). In sum, OST find that the results of ZM are not preserved when introducing labor market imperfections.
Since OST use a highly stylized labor market model-a fixed-wage approach along with a zero reservation wage (due to the absence of any utility from leisure)-it is important to scrutinize the robustness of their results with respect to modifications of the institutional setting on the labor market. OST write in their concluding remarks (p. 355): "Alternative models, such as the unemployment models of efficiency wage, trade union, and job research, can be presented. However, these extensions will show that, even though we allow for several types of labor market imperfections, the propositions in the paper are preserved."
The present paper challenges this view. To this end, we use the basic ZM model, together with the specification of the utility function as applied by OST complemented by utility from leisure time, and introduce unemployment in a general fashion. Residents either are employed and receive wage income, or they are unemployed and enjoy full leisure time. The wage rate and the employment level are determined on the labor market, which in order to achieve at greatest generality is left unspecified. In this framework, the labor market may be distorted, driving a wedge between marginal productivity of labor and the reservation wage rate, which reflects the social opportunity cost of labor. It is shown that the capital tax rate is used to internalize the distortion on the labor market and, in this way, indirectly does the job of a labor tax. However, for some institutional settings of the labor market, this distortion may be absent and employment is chosen such that the marginal productivity of labor is equal to the reservation wage rate. In this case, we get the original results of ZM: a capital tax rate equal to zero when head taxes are available, and underprovision of public goods when head taxes are unavailable. More specifically, we prove that the labor-market effect vanishes, and we thus arrive at the classical ZM capital-tax formula, whenever the wage rate and the employment level are negotiated according to some efficient solution concept, that is, if the outcome lies on the (vertical) Pareto curve. Moreover, we find that there is little scope for overprovision of public goods even if the employment level is inefficiently low.
In Sect. 2, we set up our basic model of capital tax competition, where we leave the question of the specification of the functioning of the labor market open. The implications for different specifications for the labor market model are then analyzed in Sect. 3. A possible extension of our model lies in the introduction of a labor tax as a second source of tax revenue, which we discuss in Sect. 4. Finally, in Sect. 5, we summarize our results.
